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Using micro-level panel data of about 35,000 firms from the German Cost Structure 
Census, we analyze the differences of technical efficiency across industries. Technical 
efficiency is estimated by firms’ fixed effects. One striking result is that the distribution of 
technical efficiency across industries is positively skewed. This is because the efficiency 
distribution is truncated at the lower end due to the least efficient firms which exit the 
market. We investigate the causes of technical efficiency differences across industries. Our 
econometric analyses provide evidence that capital and human capital intensity, the degree 
of vertical specialization as well as new firm formation rate are important for explaining 
the average technical efficiency of an industry. 
JEL classification:   D24, L10, L11 




“Was sind die Gründe für Branchenunterschiede im Niveau technischer Effizienz? – Eine 
empirische Untersuchung” 
Anhand von Mikro-Daten für ca. 35.000 Unternehmen aus der deutschen Kostenstruktur-
statistik analysieren wir Branchenunterschiede der technischen Effizienz. Dabei wird die 
technische Effizienz als ein unternehmensspezifischer fixer Effekt spezifiziert. Ein we-
sentliches Ergebnis besteht in dem Befund, dass die Verteilung der technischen Effizienz 
über die Branchen eine positive Schiefe aufweist. Der Grund hierfür ist offenbar darin zu 
sehen, dass die Effizienzverteilung innerhalb der Branchen jeweils am unteren Ende abge-
schnitten ist, da die Unternehmen mit relativ geringer Effizienz aus dem Markt ausschei-
den müssen. Nach den Ergebnissen unserer ökonometrischen Analyse spielen die Sachka-
pital- und Humankapitalintensität, das Ausmaß vertikaler Spezialisierung sowie die das 
Ausmaß an Marktzutritten für die Erklärung der durchschnittlichen technischen Effizienz 
einer Branche eine wesentliche Rolle. 
JEL-Klassifikation:  D24, L10, L11 
Schlagworte: Technische  Effizienz,  Branchenunterschiede, Effizienzverteilung 
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1.  Introduction 
Firms are not equally efficient. Empirical studies find indeed considerable 
variation of the efficiency of firms within (Fritsch & Stephan, 2004b) as well 
as across industries.
 1 An important category in this respect is technical 
efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the generation of the maximum 
output from a given bundle of resources. A firm is technically inefficient if it 
fails to obtain the maximum possible output. The reasons for technical 
inefficiency can be manifold and comprise all kinds of ‘mismanagement’ such 
as inappropriate work organization, deficiencies in the choice and use of 
technology (cf. Fritsch & Mallok, 2002), bottlenecks with regards to material 
flows etc. In this paper we investigate the extent and the causes of inter-
industry differences of technical efficiency. We have two main presumptions 
regarding the determinants of average technical efficiency that we aim to test 
empirically. The first is that accumulation of both tangible and intangible 
capital (human and knowledge capital) is conducive for a high level of 
technical efficiency. The second is that the average level of technical efficiency 
is higher in more competitive industries because firms with inefficient practices 
(slack and suboptimal use of inputs) are forced to improve their performance or 
to exit the market. 
Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of technical 
efficiency in several respects. First, we use a unique micro panel of about 
35,000 German enterprises over the period 1992 to 2002. This data contains 
rich information about the cost structure for each of the firms and can be 
regarded as representative for the German manufacturing sector. Second, our 
approach is not based on a stochastic frontier production function like the 
majority of previous studies, rather we estimate technical efficiency as firm-
specific fixed effects. Since this method does not require an a priori assumption 
about the distribution of technical efficiency within an industry it is less 
                                                 
1 See for example Caves & Barton (1990), Mayes, Harris & Lansbury (1994) and the 
contributions in Caves (1992) and in Mayes (1996). For an overview see Caves & Barton 
(1990, 15-20) and Caves (1992).   2
restrictive. Furthermore, we do not need to assume that a firm's level of 
technical efficiency is uncorrelated with its factor inputs. Thirdly, we examine 
the causes of cross-industry differences of technical efficiency not only for the 
average value but also for the relatively efficient and the relatively inefficient 
firms, i.e. at the upper and lower end of the efficiency distribution of the 
industry. 
One striking result of our study is that the distribution of average technical 
efficiency across industries is truncated at the lower part, and, hence, that the 
efficiency distribution is positively skewed or “skewed to the right” in most of 
the industries. This means that if the values of a distribution are in increasing 
order from the left to the right, a positively skewed distribution has the longer 
tail at the right side where the values are above the median. This result is 
noteworthy because most previous studies have (implicitly) assumed a 
negatively skewed distribution of technical efficiency across firms by applying 
a stochastic frontier model.
2 Given that the distribution is not negatively 
skewed in at least 95 percent of the industries, we suspect that the results of 
analyses based on a stochastic frontier function are probably misleading. 
The remainder is organized as follows. Methodical issues in the assessment 
of technical efficiency are discussed in more detail in Section 2. Section 3 
introduces the data and our empirical approach for measuring technical 
efficiency. Results of the estimated production function are reported in Section 
4. Section 5 gives an overview on the extent of efficiency variation between 
industries. Section 6 reviews the main hypotheses on the causes of cross-
industry efficiency variation. Results of the empirical analysis are presented 
and discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 draws some conclusions and 
indicates directions for further research. 
                                                 
2 If the distribution is negatively skewed the longer tail is at the left side with values below the 
median.   3
2.  Measuring technical (in-)efficiency 
An assessment of technical (in-)efficiency of firms or industries requires the 
measurement of efficiency and the identification of a point of reference for 
evaluating the relative efficiency level of the unit under inspection. This can be 
done in a number of different ways (see Mayes, Harris & Landsbury, 27-54, for 
an overview). All these approaches define technical efficiency as the highest 
output level that can be attained by using a given combination of inputs. Any 
deviation from this maximum is then regarded as inefficiency. The maximum 
technical efficiency in an industry can be directly obtained by estimating a 
frontier production function, i.e. a function for the input-output relationship of 
the most efficient firm(s). 
The majority of analyses that have applied this approach estimated a 
stochastic form of a frontier production function. A stochastic frontier 
production function is based on the assumption that the input-output 
relationship is not completely deterministic, but subject to influences that 
appear to be erratic. This approach of estimating maximum technical efficiency 
has the advantage that extreme outliers of highly efficient firms or data errors 
do not automatically serve as the efficiency benchmark. However, in order to 
separate the impact of technical inefficiency from the ordinary stochastic 
effects, an a priori assumption about the distribution of technical inefficiency is 
required. Because the factual efficiency of a firm cannot exceed the possible 
maximum, the distribution must be truncated at this maximum. The usual 
hypothesis in this respect is that most firms cluster close to the efficiency 
frontier and that their frequency decreases with rising inefficiency. Such a 
distribution of the residuals is negatively skewed, i.e. it has the ‘longer tail’ on 
the low efficiency side. If the distribution of residuals is not skewed but 
symmetric, the level of technical inefficiency in the respective industry is 
assumed to be not significant.
3 A positively skewed distribution of residuals is 
not consistent with the underlying assumptions. In an analysis of technical 
                                                 
3 A measure of skewness can then be used as an indicator for the level of technical inefficiency 
in the respective industry; cf. Caves & Barton (1990, 47-49) or Mayes, Harris & Lansbury 
(1994, 50-52).   4
inefficiency within German manufacturing industries based on a deterministic 
production function, Fritsch & Stephan (2004b) found that in about 95 percent 
of the industries the distribution was skewed to the right.
4 This implies that for 
the overwhelming majority of industries an assessment of technical efficiency 
by means of a stochastic production frontier function is based on an 
inappropriate assumption so that the results could be misleading. 
In order to assess technical efficiency in our sample of firms, we estimate a 
deterministic production function of the Cobb-Douglas type
5 with panel data 
for firms. This means that we avoid any a priory assumption about the 
distribution of technical efficiency as would be necessary when estimating a 
stochastic frontier production function. The production function can be written 
as 
(1)  it kit k it i it x y ε β λ α ∑ + + + = ln ln ln ,  , , , 1 p k K = , , , 1 N i K = . , , 1 T t K =   
The term it y  represents output of firm i in period t,  kit x denotes production input 
k, βk gives the output elasticity of input k ,  t λ represent a time-specific effect, 
and  i α  stands for a specific firms’ technical efficiency. There are N firms and 
Ti observations for each firm. 
                                                 
4 All the industries were from manufacturing. The analysis was based on the same data as is 
used in this paper. 
5 Attempts of estimating other types of production functions did not lead to satisfactory results. 
Estimates of a translog-type of production function frequently had rather implausible estimates 
(e.g. negative elasticities of production for certain inputs or scale elasticities larger than one). 
We suspect that the problems we experienced in estimating such other forms of production 
function than Cobb-Douglas were caused by the relatively high number of different inputs we 
are using and the statistical relationships between these inputs. Non-linear forms of a 
production function, e.g. CES, could not be estimated due to computational limitations of 
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Figure 1: The efficiency distribution curve 
Like Schmidt & Sickles (1984), we use the fixed-effects of firms as 
measures of technical efficiency. Since our approach is based on micro-data of 
individual firms, we obtain the distribution of technical efficiency estimates for 
each industry. Therefore it is possible to use a novel concept for measuring an 
industries’ technical efficiency that is based on this distribution as described by 
the efficiency distribution curve. Figure 1 shows an example of the efficiency 
distribution curve for a (fictive) sample of firms in a particular industry with 
diverging efficiency levels (see also, Fritsch & Stephan, 2004b).
6 In this graph 
the firms are arranged according to their efficiency in descending order, 
starting with the most efficient firm. This most efficient firm constitutes the 
100 percent benchmark for measuring relative technical efficiency of the other 
firms in the respective industry. Hence, efficiency of a firm is measured in 
relation to the value of the most efficient firm that represents the 100 percent 
value in this distribution. The length of the line for each firm corresponds to 
the relative size measured as share of gross production in the respective 
industry (see Figure 1).
7 Small firm are accordingly represented by short lines, 
                                                 
6 This exposition is inspired by diagrams in Salter (1969). Salter displayed productivity levels 
of firms in ascending order, starting with the least efficient firm. 
7 Other possible measures of size to be used here are the number of employees and the volume 
of turnover that represents the importance of the relevant firm on the market. The number of   6
and large firms by longer lines. The resulting curve provides an informative 
portrayal of the distribution of efficiency within the respective industry.
8  
For the econometric analyses of cross-industry differences, average 
technical efficiency is computed at the 5 percent, 50 percent and at the 95 
percent output level of each industry. Thus, we compare not only the average 
(median) efficiency level across industries, but also the relatively high and 
relatively low efficient firms. 
Another important type of efficiency – allocative efficiency – concerns the 
choice of inputs. A firm is allocatively inefficient if the input combination is 
not optimal, given input prices and their marginal productivity of the different 
inputs in the production process.
9 A firm is allocatively efficient but technically 
inefficient if it chooses an optimal input combination but does not attain the 
highest possible isoquant of its production function (see Badunenko, Fritsch & 
Stephan, 2004).  
                                                                                                                                 
employees is highly correlated with gross production and measures virtually the same thing, 
i.e. the level of economic activity in the firm. Using the volume of gross production or the 
amount of turnover as a measure of size may lead to considerably diverging results according 
to the firms’ share of value added. If firms differ with regard to their vertical range of 
manufacture, turnover does not provide comparable information about the amount of economic 
activity. A further advantage of gross production as a measure of size is that gross production 
is not affected by stock-keeping behavior. 
8 The efficiency distribution curve can be used to derive a measure of efficiency heterogeneity 
within an industry, that accounts for the relative size of the individual firms, and that is also 
rather robust with regard to extreme values. This measure is defined as the area between the 
efficiency distribution curve and the efficiency level of the median output share firm in the 
industry (the shaded area in Figure 1). We label this measure h-area, where h stands for 
heterogeneity (cf. Fritsch & Stephan, 2004a, 2004b). In contrast to other measures of 
heterogeneity such as the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation, this area measure is 
sensitive to the size of the firms. For example, it takes into account whether the highly efficient 
firms have a relatively large share or only a small share of the industries’ total output. This 
implies that the measure is reasonably robust with regard to small firms with extreme values 
that may not be considered as being representative of the industry. 
9 See Caves & Barton (1990, 9-11) or Mayes, Harris & Lansbury (1994, 12-26). The concept of 
technical inefficiency was introduced by Farrell (1957).   7
3.  Data and measurement issues 
Our estimates of firm-level efficiency are based on micro data of the German 
Cost Structure Census
10 of manufacturing for the period 1992-2002. Most of 
the other variables used in the empirical analysis are also obtained from this 
data unless indicated otherwise. The Cost Structure Census is raised and 
compiled by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
The survey comprises yearly information of all large German manufacturing 
firms with 500 and more employees. In order to limit the reporting effort for 
the smaller firms to a reasonable level, firms with 20-499 employees are 
included as a random sample that can be assumed representative for this size 
category as a whole. Firms with less than 20 employees are not included.
11  







Share of all 
firms (percent)
Cumulated 
share of all 
firms (percent) 
2 10,384 29.4 29.4 
3 5,635 15.96 45.36 
4 4,948 14.01 59.37 
5 4,537 12.85 72.22 
6 3,737 10.58 82.8 
7 1,780 5.04 87.84 
8 1,056 2.99 90.83 
9 1,303 3.69 94.52 
10 439 1.24 95.76 
11 1,496 4.24 100 
Total 35,315 100 – 
                                                 
10 Aggregate figures are published annually in Fachserie 4, Reihe 4.3 "Kostenstrukturerhebung 
im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe" of the German Statistisches Bundesamt. 
11 Beginning with the year 2001 the data also contains firms with 1-19 employees. These firms 
are, however, not included in our analysis because due to a rotating sampling scheme only one 
observation is available for most of these small firms.   8
As a rule, the smaller firms report for four subsequent years and are then 
substituted by other small firms (rotating panel).
12 Because the estimation of 
firm-specific fixed effects requires at least two observations, firms with only 
one observation are excluded in our sample that comprises a total of about 
35,000 firms. Table 1 shows the frequency of firms with different numbers of 
observations in our data set. 
Our measure of output is gross production. This comprises mainly the 
turnover plus the net-change of the stock of final products. We do not include 
turnover from activities that are classified as miscellaneous such as license 
fees, commissions, rents and leasing etc. because we assume that such revenue 
can only be poorly explained by means of a production function. Our data 
contains information for a number of input categories. These categories are 
payroll, employers’ contribution to the social security system, fringe benefits, 
expenditure for material inputs, self-provided equipment and goods for resale, 
for energy, for external wagework, external maintenance and repair, tax 
depreciation of fixed assets, subsidies, rents and leases, insurance costs, sales 
tax, other taxes and public fees, interest payments on outside capital as well as 
“other” costs for instance license fees, bank charges, postage or expenses for 
marketing and transport. Further information available in the Cost Structure 
Census is industry affiliation, location of headquarter, stock of raw materials, 
of goods for resale and of final output, R&D expenditure and number of R&D 
employees.
13 The information on employment comprises the number of active 
owners, the number of employees, of trainees, of part-time employees, of home 
workers and the number of temporary workers. 
Some of the cost categories like expenditure for external wagework and for 
external maintenance and repair contain a relatively high share of reported zero 
values because many firms do not utilize these types of inputs. Because all 
                                                 
12 Due to mergers or insolvencies some firms have less than four observations. Note, however, 
that firms are legally obliged to respond to the Cost Structure Census, so there are actually no 
missing observations due to non-response. 
13 Information on the resources devoted to R&D is raised in the Cost Structure Census since 
1999.   9
inputs of the Cobb-Douglas production function are included as logarithms, 
such zero inputs lead to missing values and result in the exclusion of the 
respective firm from the analysis. Moreover, zero input values are not 
consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and would imply zero 
output. In order to reduce the number of reported zero input quantities we 
aggregated the inputs into the following categories: material inputs 
(intermediate material consumption plus commodity inputs), labor 
compensation (salaries and wages plus employer's social insurance 
contributions), energy consumption, user cost of capital (depreciation plus 
rents and leases), external services (e.g., repair costs and external wagework) 
and other inputs related to production (e.g., transportation services, consulting 
or marketing). All input and output series were deflated using the producer 
price index for the respective industry. 
Table 2:  Cost shares of inputs in total production 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Coefficient 
of variation
Material  inputs  0.410 0.407 0.165 0.018 0.854 40.303 
Labor compensation  0.330 0.320 0.136 0.053 0.840 41.318 
Energy consumption  0.021 0.013 0.023 0.001 0.170 110.663 
User cost of capital  0.067 0.056 0.042 0.008 0.277 63.353 
External services  0.047 0.028 0.053 0.001 0.334 112.786 
Other inputs  0.092 0.079 0.059 0.010 0.362 63.601 
 
Including the yearly depreciation values as proxy variables for capital input 
leads to implausibly low estimates for the output elasticity of capital. We 
presume that the reason for these low values is the relatively high year by year 
variation of depreciations. In order to reduce this volatility, we calculated 
average yearly depreciations by adding up for each year the depreciations in 
the current year and of all the preceding years that we have information about.   10
This sum was then divided by the number of years with observations.
14 Using 
this average value of yearly depreciations results in a considerably higher 
estimate of output elasticity of capital in the production function. 
Average cost shares of these input categories and other summary statistics 
for the cost shares are reported in Table 2. The dominant cost categories are 
material inputs and payroll, which together add up to about 75 percent of 
expenses. All cost shares sum up to 0.967. The difference from unity of about 
3.3 percent can be interpreted as the share of gross profits in production. Firms 
with less than 500 employees, which are only included in the Cost Structure 
Census as a representative random sample, have been multiplied with weights 
greater or equal to one for the estimation of the production function. These 
weights represent the relationship between the number of firms in the 
respective industry and size category in the full population, and the number of 
firms of respective size and industry that is included in our sample.
15 Since 
these weights are rather stable over time, we use the weights for the year 1997 
for all estimations.  
The sample contains a number of observations with extreme values that 
proved to have a considerable impact on the estimated parameters of the 
production function and led to implausible results. We therefore exclude those 
‘outliers’ from the analysis for which the cost for a certain input category in 
relation to gross output is less than the lowest (1 percent) and the highest (99 
percent) percentile. In total, these excluded cases (plus firms with zero values 
for certain input categories) make about 10 percent of all observations. We find 
that the exclusion of these extreme cases leads to considerable improvement of 
the estimation results. 
                                                 
14 Example: Assume that the data set provides information on depreciations of a certain firm 
for the years ‘93, ‘94, ‘95 and ‘96. Average yearly depreciation for the year ‘95 is the average 
of the years ‘93 – ‘95. For the year ‘96 it is the average of the years ‘93-‘96 etc. For the year 
‘93 the average equals the value for this year. 
15 Example: If only 25 percent of the firms of a particular size class are included in the sample 
each observation is multiplied by a factor of 4.   11
4.  Production function estimates 
In order to generate the fixed effects as a measure of technical efficiency, a 
Cobb-Douglas production function according to (1) was estimated on the basis 
of the micro-data for individual firms. Table 3 displays the parameter 
estimates. The second column reports the results for a pooled OLS estimation. 
The third column displays the results for the panel approach with fixed effects 
for individual firms. These serve as our measures of firms’ technical 
efficiency.
16 In both versions we included dummy variables for the different  




Estimate       t-value 
LSDV 
Estimate       t-value 
Intercept 1.803**       (278.99)  fixed effects** 
Material inputs  0.373**       (645.33)  0.377**       (374.28) 
Labor compensation  0.353**       (368.65)  0.412**       (212.51) 
Energy consumption  0.017**       (32.93)  0.020**       (23.46) 
User cost of capital  0.086 **      (110.99)  0.067**       (43.75) 
External services  0.057**       (144.24)  0.046**       (108.06) 
Other inputs  0.101**       (163.08)  0.070**       (94.05) 
1992 dummy  0.014**       (6.52)  0.028**       (20.28) 
1993 dummy  -0.005**     (-2.31)  0.008**       (5.45) 
1994 dummy  -0.0003**   (-0.16)  0.012**       (8.93) 
1995 dummy  0.007**       (3.28)  0.020**       (15.25) 
1996 dummy  0.001           (0.56)  0.014**       (10.43) 
1997 dummy  0.018**       (8.60)  0.019**       (12.82) 
1998 dummy  0.018**       (8.50)  0.018**       (12.46) 
1999 dummy  0.019**       (8.91)  0.019**       (16.99) 
2000 dummy  0.017**       (8.16)  0.019**       (16.38) 
2001 dummy  0.012**       (5.79)  0.012**       (10.89) 
R² 0.9836  0.9964 
F-test fixed effects  ― 12.83** 
F-test CRS (value RS)  1332.39**    (0.9861)  21.6**     (0.9922) 
Number of observations  156,053  156,053 
t-values in parentheses. *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **: statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
                                                 
16 Least Squares Dummy Variables method for panel data; see Baltagi (2001) and Coelli et al. 
(1998) for this approach.   12
years of the observation period, with 2002 being the year of reference. The fit 
of the regressions (R
2) is remarkably high and the dummies for the different 
years are highly significant.
17 The sum of the estimated output elasticities 
amounts to 0.98 for the pooled regression and to 0.99 for the panel regression. 
According to neoclassical production theory profit maximizing firms will 
choose that combination of inputs for which the cost share of each input equals 
the respective elasticity of production. The relatively close correspondence of 
the estimated production elasticities and the average cost shares of the 
respective input (Table 2) indicates that the parameters of our production 
functions are in a plausible range and that the model is apparently properly 
specified. Generally, the fixed-effects panel estimates are somewhat closer to 
the cost shares but the differences to the results of pooled regression are rather 
small. The positive values of most year dummies indicate a higher productivity 
in the respective year than in the reference year 2002. This suggests that these 
dummies are not simply a measure of technical progress, because the ongoing 
advancement over time would lead to negative values of the year dummies. For 
this reason, we assume that the values of the year dummies reflect mainly the 
macro-economic conditions which were relatively unfavorable with a 
considerable underutilization of capacities in 2002 as well as in the year 1993, 
for which a negative value of the respective dummy variable was found. 
5.  The extent and distribution of technical efficiency differences across 
industries 
We have already mentioned (Section 2) the common assumption that the 
distribution of technical efficiencies within an industry is skewed to the left. 
This means that the values of technical efficiency of most firms is clustered 
near the efficiency frontier and that their frequency declines with rising 
inefficiency. The distribution should, therefore, have a longer tail at the left 
hand side. Such a kind of skewness constitutes indeed a precondition for 
                                                 
17 Note that a Hausman-Wu test indicated correlation between fixed effects and the other 
explanatory variables (results are available from the authors upon request). Thus, a random 
effects model or a stochastic frontier framework would not be appropriate in this case.   13
estimating a stochastic frontier production function (Greene, 1997). In analyses 
of the distribution of technical efficiency within industries we have found, 
however, that in 95 percent of the industries this distribution is skewed to the 
right (Fritsch & Stephan, 2004b). Fritsch & Stephan (2004b) explain this 
skewness to the right by a truncation of the efficiency distribution at low 
efficiency values. Such a truncation of low efficient firms occurs because these 
firms are not able to earn their cost and are, therefore, forced to exit the market. 
Since factor costs such as wages are about the same for all industries, this 
lower efficiency frontier should be located at about the same level of technical 
efficiency (for a more detailed explanation see Fritsch & Stephan, 2004b). 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of technical efficiency at different relative 
efficiency levels across the 241 four-digit NACE industries.
18 In our analysis of 
cross-industry differences we compare different points of the intra-industry 
distribution according to the efficiency distribution curve (Figure 1). If firms in 
each industry are weighted with their output and sorted according to the value 
of the firm-specific effect in descending order, technical efficiency at the 5 
percent output level is the value of the firm which represents the 5th percentile 
of this distribution. It is the level of technical efficiency between the most 
efficient 5 percent of industry output and the less efficient firms. Accordingly, 
technical efficiency at the 50 percent output level is the value of the median 
output unit and the value for the 95 percent output level is the technical 
efficiency at the 95th percentile, i.e. at the lower end of the efficiency scale. 
For each of these output levels, technical efficiency of an industry is expressed 
in relation to the industry with the highest value of fixed effect which is 
assigned a value of one. Therefore, the measure of an industries’ relative level 
of technical efficiency can assume values between zero and unity. 
                                                 
18 Note that industries with less than five firms were excluded. We also excluded manufacture 
of tobacco products (NACE 16.00) because this industry is an extreme outlier with a high level 
of technical efficiency. This high level of technical efficiency is probably a result of the 
relatively high advertisement costs which are not properly taken into account in the input 
variables of our production function.   14
 
a)  At output level 5 percent 
 
b)  At output level 50 percent   15
 
c)  At output level 95 percent 
Figure 2:  The distribution of technical efficiency at different output levels 
across industries 
For all output levels, we observe that the distribution of average efficiency 
is skewed to the right and is particularly characterized by some ‘outlier’ 
industries with relatively high levels of technical efficiency. Thus, the 
distribution of technical efficiency is positively skewed not only within 
industries but also across industries. The reason for this positive skewness is 
the truncation of the intra-industry distribution of technical efficiency at the 
lower end, caused by the exit of low efficient firms which do not manage to be 
sufficiently profitable to survive competition. Because this kind of truncation 
pertains to the firms at the lower end of the intra-industry efficiency 
distribution, the skewness of the cross-industry distribution should be less 
pronounced at higher intra-industry levels of efficiency. The skewness statistics 
for the three efficiency distributions (Table 4) are in accordance with this 
prediction. We observe positive values of skewness statistics indicating longer 
tails of the distribution at the right hand side for all three distributions. As 
could be expected, the value of the skewness statistic is highest for the   16
distribution of technical efficiency at the 95 percent output level where 
truncation should be most significant. Another noteworthy result is that the 
variation of technical efficiency among industries is much larger for the firms 
with a relatively high level of technical efficiency (output level 5 percent) as 
compared to the relatively low efficient firms (95 percent output level). This is 
also to be expected given the truncation of the efficiency distribution at the 
lower end. There is a pronounced positive relationship between the relative 
technical efficiency of the different levels (Table 5). The correlation of relative 
positions across industries is relatively high. Thus, industries with a significant 
share of highly efficient firms are likely to also have relatively high efficient 
firms at the lower part of the distribution curve. 
Table 4:  Parameters of the distribution of technical efficiency at different 
output levels across industries 
Statistic 
TE at output 
level 5 % 
TE at output 
level 50 %
TE at output 
level 95 % 
Mean  0.572 0.569 0.572 
Standard  deviation  0.099 0.078 0.068 
Coefficient  of  variation 17.23 13.65 11.94 
Skewness  1.430 2.069 2.225 
Kurtosis 3.383  6.138  10.082 
Range  0.590 0.533 0.636 
99
th  percentile  0.990 0.826 0.820 
95
th  percentile  0.739 0.711 0.688 
90
th  percentile  0.690 0.662 0.648 
Median  0.555 0.547 0.558 
10
th  percentile  0.473 0.502 0.512 
5
th  percentile  0.451 0.491 0.496 
1
st  percentile  0.420 0.471 0.470 
Minimum  0.410 0.467 0.364 
Table 5:  Correlation of relative efficiency levels across industries
†  
 
TE at output 
level 5 % 
TE at output 
level 50 % 
TE at output 
level 95 % 
TE at output level 5 %  1 0.7183  0.4944 
TE at output level 50 %  1  0.7309 
† Pearson correlation coefficients. n = 241. All reported correlations are statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.   17
Table 6:  Average level and distribution of technical efficiency in two-digit 
industries
†







5 %  50 %  95 %   
Mining of coal; extraction 
of  peat  [10]  67 0.734 0.612 0.603 0.122 
Other mining and quarrying 
[14]  301 0.914 1.000 0.828 0.188 
Food and beverages [15]  3,965 0.905 0.864 0.814 0.111 
Textiles [17]  1,405 0.821 0.681 0.674 0.122 
Apparel, fur [18]  914 0.909 0.795 0.782 0.159 
Leather; luggage, saddlery, 
footwear [19]  361 0.850 0.721 0.740 0.200 
Wood and cork (except 
furniture)  [20]  1,193 0.860 0.673 0.688 0.129 
Pulp and paper [21]  934 0.864 0.692 0.701 0.122 
Publishing, printing, 
reproduction [22]  1,691 0.848 0.823 0.716 0.119 
Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel 
[23]  57 1.000 0.936 1.000 0.176 
Chemicals [24]  1,500 0.832 0.720 0.720 0.095 
Rubber and plastics [25]  2,020 0.830 0.644 0.680 0.111 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products [26]  2,120 0.856 0.694 0.706 0.121 
Basic metals [27]  1,020 0.851 0.773 0.698 0.131 
Fabricated metal products 
(except machinery and 
equipment) [28]  4,732 0.845 0.674 0.680 0.092 
Machinery and equipment 
[29]  5,251 0.816 0.628 0.666 0.080 
Office machinery and 
computers [30]  199 0.834 0.675 0.704 0.180 
Electrical machinery [31]  1,740 0.832 0.611 0.655 0.066 
Radio, television and 
communication equipment 
[32]  486 0.808 0.768 0.743 0.149 
Medical, precision and 
optical instruments [33]  1,500 0.820 0.679 0.671 0.099 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers [34]  1,251 0.885 0.642 0.728 0.069 
Other transport equipment 
[35]  372 0.775 0.588 0.667 0.105 
Furniture; manufacturing 
n.e.c. [36]  2,103 0.835 0.677 0.667 0.074 
Recycling [37]  96 0.968 0.791 0.863 0.199 
 
† The two-digit industries NACE 11, 12 are excluded because of an insufficient number of 
observations. NACE 16 (tobacco) is excluded because of extreme values. 
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Table 6 exhibits average technical efficiencies for the two-digit industries 
at different output levels. It also gives the number of firms at this 2-digit level. 
Furthermore, the corresponding within-industry heterogeneity of technical 
efficiency is reported, as indicated by the h-area measure. At the 2-digit level, 
the differences of technical efficiency across industries are less pronounced 
than at the 4-digit level. Again, variation is much higher at the 5 percent output 
level (i.e. among the firms with relatively high levels of technical efficiency) as 
compared to the 95 percent level (the relatively inefficient firms). Relatively 
large levels of within-industry heterogeneity of technical efficiency can be 
found for the leather industry (NACE 19) as well as for the recycling industry 
(NACE 37) whereas, for instance, the automobile industry (NACE 34) is quite 
homogenous in this respect. 
6.  Hypotheses and variables 
Differences of technical efficiency across industries may have a number of 
explanations.
19 One can expect that factor inputs such as tangible and 
intangible capital will have a strong impact on the level of technical efficiency. 
Regarding physical capital intensity, a comprehensive equipment of the 
workforce with capital goods may indicate a broad application of available 
technology that can lead to highly efficient production. We therefore expect a 
positive impact of high capital intensity on technical efficiency. Our measure 
for capital intensity is a firms’ average yearly depreciation over gross 
production. Furthermore, the effect of high human capital intensity, i.e. the 
share of skilled labor that is used in the production process, on technical 
efficiency is expected to be positive. We use the share of employees with a 
university degree as the indicator for the knowledge intensity. One may expect 
that a high intensity of Research and Development (R&D) in an industry has a 
positive effect on average efficiency. This may particularly hold for process 
innovation activity that is directly aimed at improving productivity. However, 
Albach (1980) and Caves & Barton (1990) found a negative impact of R&D 
                                                 
19 See Caves (1992) for a review of hypotheses and the empirical evidence.   19
intensity on technical efficiency. In explaining this negative effect Caves & 
Barton (1990, 76) suppose that R&D expenditures made in a certain industry 
are only a poor predictor of the innovativeness of that industry because large 
parts of the innovation output is applied in other industries. We measure the 
intensity of innovation activity with the average yearly share of R&D 
expenditure in the years 1999-2002 on gross production (source: Cost Structure 
Census). 
Market structure and competition should also have a considerable effect on 
the level of an industry’s technical efficiency. If competition is intense, firms 
with slack in the utilization of inputs are not sufficiently profitable and will 
sooner or later have to exit the market. One main aspect of competition is 
market contestability. A high start-up rate in an industry indicates a high level 
of contestability implying strong competitive pressure. We may, therefore, 
expect a positive relationship between the level of start-ups and average 
technical efficiency. The start-up rate is calculated here as the average yearly 
number of newly founded businesses in the period 1998-2001 over the average 
number of employees in the respective industry.
20 According to the 
presumption that competition stimulates firms’ technical efficiencies, we also 
expect an increase of technical efficiency as market concentration decreases. 
One may, however, also argue that an ‘atomistic’ market structure with a high 
number of small suppliers is characterized by a relatively low level of 
competitive pressure and that, under such circumstances, an increase of 
concentration may lead to some intensification of this competitive pressure. 
Such a stimulating effect of concentration on the intensity of competition and 
efficiency may occur until a certain concentration level is reached, from which 
point on increased market power leads to reduction of competitive pressure and 
allows for inefficiencies. Therefore, the relationship between market structure, 
as measured by the Herfindahl index, and the average level of inefficiency of 
an industry could be u-shaped. The Herfindahl index has been calculated on the 
basis of the Cost Structure Census. A measure of the competitive pressure that 
                                                 
20 The data are taken from the establishment file of the German Social Insurance Statistics; see 
Fritsch & Brixy (2004) for a description of this data source.   20
is created by international competition is the ratio of imports to domestic 
production. The higher the import quota the more intense the competition of 
foreign suppliers, inducing a relatively high level of technical efficiency in the 
surviving firms. 
Table 7:  Overview of hypotheses about the effects of different factors on the 
average level of efficiency across industries 
Determinants of technical efficiency  Expected sign for relationship 
with technical efficiency 
Tangible and intangible capital   
Physical capital intensity  + 
Human capital intensity  + 
R&D intensity  – / + 
Market structure and competition   
New firm formation rate  + 
Market concentration  – / + 
Import share  + 
Production technology   
Average firm size  – / + 
Vertical specialization  + 
Further industry characteristics   
Entrepreneurial character of an industries’ 
technological regime 
+ 
Output growth rate  – / + 
 
Another group of factors that may affect the level of technical efficiency in 
an industry consists of production technology (e.g. the extent of economies of 
scale) and the degree of vertical specialization. The degree of vertical 
specialization in an industry can be measured, for example, as the ratio of 
intermediate inputs to internal wage cost. This measure reflects the degree of 
labor division and outsourcing in an industry. A relatively high ratio of 
intermediate inputs to internal wage cost indicates a high level of outsourcing 
and division of labor. Since labor division and specialization can be assumed to 
be conducive to technical efficiency the relationship should be positive. If large 
firm size allows for the realization of cost advantages, the relationship between   21
an industry’s average firm size
21 and the level of technical efficiency should be 
positive (Caves & Barton, 1990, 82-84). There are, however, at least two 
reasons for expecting a negative relationship. First, large firms may, because of 
their size, suffer more from bureaucratic frictions and lacking motivation of 
personnel than smaller firms. And second, if small firms run into economic 
problems due to a low technical efficiency, they are much more likely to exit 
the market than larger firms.
22 Due to this effect of market selection, the 
surviving small firms that we observe may on average show a higher level of 
technical efficiency than the larger firms. 
Two further industry characteristics may also have significant effect on the 
level of technical efficiency: the characteristics of an industry’s technological 
regime and its output growth rate. An industry under a routinized technological 
regime can be expected to be rather homogeneous due to intensive price 
competition among large suppliers of rather similar goods that are 
manufactured with highly standardized processes (Audretsch, 1995, 39-64; 
Winter, 1984). For this reason and due to a relatively high share of R&D that is 
devoted to process innovation in such a regime, the average technical 
efficiency level of the industry should be relatively high. Under an 
entrepreneurial regime, products and processes are more diverse inducing a 
relatively high importance of competition by quality as compared to price 
competition. Moreover, processes are less standardized. This high level of 
heterogeneity can be expected to result in an average level of efficiency that is 
relatively low.  
                                                 
21 Measured as mean of the log(number of employees); source: Cost Structure Census. 
22 Large firms are much more able to shrink as a reaction to economic problems than smaller 
firms which have a higher risk of falling below the minimum efficient size when reducing 
output.   22
The development stage or maturity of an industry is reflected by the 
average of firms’ growth rates. However, the effect of the industry’s growth 
rate on the average technical efficiency level is unclear. On the one hand, 
growth may induce high investment and speedy adoption of new technology. 
On the other hand, economic prosperity may be associated with only low 
pressure to modernize machinery and, thus, allows for relatively low efficiency 
and a correspondingly high degree of heterogeneity. We include other industry 
characteristics such as the share of West German firms and the type of 
produced good (intermediate, investment goods, durable and non-durable 
consumer goods) as control variables in the regression. An overview on our 
hypotheses is given in Table 7. Table A1 in the Appendix gives the definition 
of the independent variables as used in the empirical analysis. Table A2 
provides descriptive statistics of the independent variables and Table A3 gives 
the correlations and tolerance factors of all right-hand side variables. The 
values for the tolerance factor indicate that multicollinearity between the 
explanatory variables is not significant.
23 
7.  Econometric results 
For analyzing the determinants of technical efficiency across industries, 
regressions based on three different methods were estimated. The first method 
was ordinary least squares (OLS). Since OLS is rather sensitive with regard to 
extreme values, we also applied Reweighted Least Squares (RLS) to test 
whether the results are robust with regard to such extreme observations. RLS is 
based on Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) regression results (see Rousseeuw & 
Leroy, 1987, for details). As a third method we performed regressions based on 
the rank values of the variables (Conover & Iman, 1982; Iman & Conover, 
1979; Table 8). This approach may have two advantages. First, like LTS 
regression, rank regression is rather robust with regard to outliers. Secondly, 
because values are rank transformed, non-linear monotonous relationships may 
                                                 
23 As suggested by Besley et al. (1980), the critical value for the tolerance indicating severe 
multicollinearity is 0.1 or below. For all variables, tolerances are well above 0.1. That 
multicollinearity is negligible for the chosen specifications is also confirmed by the condition 
indices for the regressions, which are all well below the critical value of 100.   23
be identified that would not have been found with the other two regression 
methods. However, as far as ‘true’ relationships are linear, rank regression will 
Table 8:  Estimations on the determinants of differences in technical efficiency 
at the 5 percent output level across industries
† 
 OLS  RLS  Rank 
   Estimate  t-value Estimate t-value  Estimate  t-value 
Intercept 0.530** (7.70) 0.443** (9.70) 98.1  (1.75)
Vertical specialization  0.029** (6.32) 0.032** (10.62) 0.378** (5.47)
Capital intensity  1.838** (5.54) 0.953** (3.72) 0.159* (2.23)
Human capital 
intensity 0.506** (4.96) 0.058  (0.71) 0.356** (4.55)
R&D intensity  -0.615  -(0.77) 0.883  (1.60) -0.138  -(1.86)
Average firm size  -0.028** -(3.36) -0.009  -(1.67) -0.254** -(3.18)
New firm formation  4.128* (2.20) 4.750** (3.80) 0.139  (1.91)
Herfindahl index  -0.139** -(2.63) -0.173** -(4.84) -0.167* -(2.47)
Average sales growth  -0.430** -(2.91) -0.151  -(1.46) -0.054  -(0.87)
Share of West German 
Firms 0.030  (0.57) 0.048  (1.40) -0.019  -(0.32)
Dummy for 
intermediate products  -0.006 -(0.28) 0.000  -(0.02) -0.076  -(0.52)
Dummy for producers 
of investment goods  -0.037 -(1.47) -0.014  -(0.85) -0.318* -(2.00)
Dummy for producers 
of non-durable 
consumer goods  0.027  (1.14) 0.029  (1.86) 0.182  (1.23)
R-squared (adj.)  0.392  0.503  0.327 
Error degrees of 
freedom  228 201  228 
Root mean squared 
error 0.079  0.05  58.7 
Number of 
observations 241  214 241 
†  t-values in parentheses. *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **: statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. For all reported regressions, specification tests according to White (1980, p. 822) do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic and independent of the regressors. These test results are available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
be relatively inefficient. The dependent variables of the regressions are 
technical efficiencies at the 5, 50 and 95 percent output level of industries. The 
estimation results are shown in Tables 8 to 10. Table 11 gives an overview on 
the results.   24
Regarding the importance of tangible and intangible capital intensity for 
average technical efficiency, we find a significant positive impact from both 
physical and human capital intensity. The relationship between an industry’s 
R&D intensity and its technical efficiency is not statistically significant for 
average technical efficiency the 5 and 50 percent output level. This is in line 
with the descriptive evidence of Table 6, which indicates that R&D intensive 
Table 9:  Estimations on the determinants of differences in technical efficiency 
at the 50 percent output level across industries
† 
 OLS  RLS  Rank 
   Estimate  t-value  Estimate  t-value  Estimate  t-value 
Intercept 0.448** (10.22) 0.434** (18.07)  -25.5  -(0.52) 
Vertical specialization  0.039** (13.38) 0.037** (22.54)  0.505** (8.42) 
Capital intensity  1.429** (6.75) 0.912** (6.03)  0.188** (3.02) 
Human Capital 
Intensity 0.249** (3.84)  0.078  (1.71)  0.350** (5.14) 
R&D  intensity  -0.029 -(0.06) 0.663* (2.22)  -0.199** -(3.08) 
Average firm size  -0.023** -(4.47) -0.012** -(4.02)  -0.216** -(3.11) 
New firm formation  2.610* (2.18) 3.928** (6.09) 0.149* (2.36) 
Herfindahl index  0.086** (2.54) 0.056** (2.84) 0.118* (2.02) 
Average  sales  growth  -0.134 -(1.43) 0.106* (2.01) -0.003  -(0.05) 
Share of West German 
Firms 0.069* (2.10) 0.041* (2.20) 0.081 (1.55) 
Dummy for 
intermediate products  -0.002  -(0.11)  -0.007  -(0.89)  -0.009  -(0.07) 
Dummy for producers 
of investment goods  -0.001 -(0.05)  0.001  (0.12) -0.101  -(0.73) 
Dummy for producers 
of non-durable 
consumer goods  0.037* (2.48) 0.021** (2.64)  0.347** (2.69) 
R-squared (adj.)  0.601  0.801  0.492 
Error degrees of 
freedom 228  192  228 
Root mean squared 
error  0.05 0.025  50.9 
Number of 
observations 241 205  241 
†  t-values in parentheses. *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **: statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. For all reported regressions, specification tests according to White (1980, p. 822) do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic and independent of the regressors. These test results are available from 
the authors upon request.  
 
industries – e.g. chemicals [NACE 24], office machinery and computers 
[NACE 30] or radio, television and communication equipment [NACE 32] – 
are not among the most efficient industries. However, the relationship between 
R&D and efficiency is strongly negative for the 95 percent output level, i.e. for   25
the least efficient firms in the industries. This confirms the findings of Albach 
(1980) and Caves & Barton (1990). As already mentioned, this result could be 
explained by the conjecture that a considerable part of the innovations 
generated in an industry have no effect on this industry’s performance because 
they are mainly applied in other industries. Another explanation could be that 
the efficiency enhancing effect of R&D expenditure occurs with a considerable 
time lag. The negative sign of the coefficient would also be consistent with the 
assumption that the least efficient firms make relatively high R&D 
expenditures in order to compensate for their inefficiency. 
Table 10:  Estimations on the determinants of differences in technical 
efficiency at the 95 percent output level across industries
† 
 OLS  RLS  Rank 
    Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
Intercept 0.430** (11.38) 0.579** (22.99)  -49.0  -(0.98) 
Vertical specialization  0.030** (11.97) 0.019** (10.65) 0.380** (6.20) 
Capital intensity  1.255** (6.87) 0.650**  (5.53) 0.119 (1.87) 
Human Capital 
Intensity 0.251** (4.48) 0.284** (8.09) 0.289** (4.16) 
R&D intensity  -1.783** -(4.08) -2.068** -(7.77) -0.259** -(3.94) 
Average firm size  -0.008  -(1.67)  -0.019**  -(6.42) -0.097 -(1.38) 
New firm formation  0.057  (0.06)  -0.983  -(1.67)  0.118  (1.82) 
Herfindahl index  0.151** (5.19) 0.099** (5.51) 0.202** (3.38) 
Average sales growth  0.089  (1.09)  0.168** (3.44) 0.126* (2.30) 
Share of West German 
Firms  0.046 (1.60) 0.006 (0.33) -0.029  -(0.54) 
Dummy for 
intermediate  products  -0.009 -(0.73) -0.014 -(1.87) 0.146  (1.13) 
Dummy for producers 
of investment goods  -0.002 -(0.15) -0.018*  -(2.26) -0.040 -(0.28) 
Dummy for producers 
of non-durable 
consumer  goods  0.023 (1.77) 0.013 (1.71)  0.450** (3.42) 
R-squared (adj.)  0.617  0.695  0.471 
Error degrees of 
freedom 228  193  228 
Root mean squared 
error  0.043 0.023 52.041 
Number of 
observations 241  206  241 
†  t-values in parentheses. *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **: statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. For all reported regressions, specification tests according to White (1980, p. 822) do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic and independent of the regressors. These test results are available from 
the authors upon request.  
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The impact of industry concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index 
on technical efficiency is negative for the most efficient firms at output level 5 
percent, but positive for output levels 50 percent and 95 percent. The highest 
level of significance is found for the 95 percent output level. These findings 
suggest that for the most efficient firms, high market concentration leads to a 
relatively low level of average technical efficiency because competitive 
pressure for these firms in concentrated markets is low. However, at the lower 
part of the efficiency distribution curve, competitive pressure and thus 
efficiency in concentrated markets seems to be quite intense.  
Table 11:  Summary of findings
† 
  Technical efficiency at different output levels
Independent variables  5 %  50 %  95 % 
Tangible and intangible capital     
Physical capital intensity  +  +  + 
Human Capital Intensity  +  +  + 
R&D intensity  n.s.  (+ / –)  – 
Market structure and 
competition 
   
New firm formation rate  +  +  n.s. 
Herfindahl index  –  +  + 
Import share  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
Production technology     
Average firm size  –  –  (–) 
Vertical specialization  +  +  + 
Industry characteristics     
Average of firms’ sales growth  (–)  +  + 
Share of West German firms  n.s.  +  n.s. 
Entrepreneurial regime  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
















Dummy for producers of non-








†  Signs of coefficient if statistically significant. Without parentheses: sign statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level in at least two models; in parentheses: variable was 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in only one of the models reported; n.s.: variable 
was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level in any of the models reported. 
 
The results with regards to another source of competitive pressure, the 
occurrence of new firm entry into the industry, are completely in line with our 
expectations. A high level of new firm formation leads to a high level of 
average efficiency, particularly among the relatively efficient firms at output   27
level 5 percent and 50 percent. This suggests a stimulating role of market 
contestability and competition on technical efficiency. No statistically 
significant effect could be found for the import share of an industry. Therefore, 
this variable has not been included in the final version of the empirical models 
that are presented here. 
One of the strongest impacts on average technical efficiency is exerted by 
the degree of vertical specialization and labor division in an industry. Thus, as 
has been shown in other studies (Görzig & Stephan, 2002), a high degree of 
vertical disintegration leads to a high level of technical efficiency. It is quite 
remarkable that the effect of an industry’s average firm size on technical 
efficiency is significantly negative, particularly at the upper (5 percent output 
level) and middle part (50 percent output level) of the efficiency distribution 
curve. The negative relationship indicates that larger firms tend to suffer from 
higher levels of technical inefficiency than smaller firms. This finding could be 
explained by higher complexity in larger firms that makes identification of 
inefficiency more difficult than in small firms. Another explanation is based on 
a ‘survivor bias’ in the data: larger firms are better able to survive high levels 
of technical inefficiency than small firms which may be more likely forced to 
exit if they are inefficient. In this case, however, we would expect a relatively 
pronounced negative relationship between average size and efficiency even for 
the low efficient firms, i.e. at the 95 percent level. 
High average sales growth rate in an industry is conducive for attaining a 
high average efficiency level at the 50 percent and 95 percent output level, i.e. 
for the average and low efficient firms. It is somewhat surprising that industries 
with a larger share of West German firms are not generally more efficient, but 
only at output level 50 percent. Our estimates suggest that industries producing 
durable consumer goods are more efficient than those producing non-durable 
goods. Industries for intermediate goods and for investment goods tend to 
attain a relatively low level of technical efficiency. No significant effect could 
be found for the technological regime of an industry. This variable has, 
therefore, been omitted in the final version of the model due to close 
correlation with average firm size.   28
8.  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we have estimated technical efficiencies of firms as fixed effects. 
Our analysis is based on a unique and representative panel data set of about 
35,000 firms from the German Cost Structure census. The fixed effects 
approach has two major advantages over the stochastic frontier framework 
which has been applied in most of the previous studies. First, the fixed effects 
approach does not require that a firm’s technical efficiency and its factor inputs 
are uncorrelated. For our sample we can show that a significant degree of 
correlation between these variables and technical efficiency estimates exists. 
Second, the fixed effects approach does not require the assumption that the 
distribution of technical efficiencies is negatively skewed. Indeed, we find 
pronounced positive skewness of the efficiency distribution within as well as 
across industries. The explanation for this finding is a truncation at the lower 
efficiency end. The least efficient firms are not able to earn their cost and, 
therefore, are forced to exit the market. 
Our empirical analyses have shown that there are considerable differences 
of average technical efficiency across industries. We identified a number of 
factors that are important for explaining these differences. The strongest effect 
was found for the degree of vertical specialization, i.e. a high degree of labor 
division between firms (outsourcing) results in relatively high levels of average 
efficiency. Furthermore, physical as well as human capital intensity has a 
positive impact on average technical efficiency. Surprisingly, high R&D 
expenditures are not conducive for the efficiency of an industry. In fact, we 
find a negative sign for the impact of R&D intensity on technical efficiency for 
the least efficient firms. This finding may be explained by a pronounced 
diffusion of innovations across industries or by a long time lag for R&D 
expenditure to become effective. One may also assume that the least efficient 
firms have higher R&D expenditures to compensate for their inefficiency. 
The positive effect that we find for the new firm formation rate indicates 
that competition and contestability are stimulating for technical efficiency. 
Average efficiency is higher in high-entry industries because survival of 
inefficient firms is threatened by intensive competition. This indicates that   29
slack and sub-optimal use of factor inputs can only persist when competition is 
not very pronounced.  
Our analyses have so far been static as they regarded only the time-
invariant level of technical efficiency thereby neglecting its dynamic evolution 
and the consequences for competition and industry evolution. As soon as better 
data becomes available, i.e. longer series of firm-level data, future research 
should investigate these dynamics of technical efficiency.   30
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Appendix 
Table A1:  Definition of independent variables 
Variable Definition 
Capital intensity  Mean of annual depreciations plus expenditures for rents and leases 
over sales at firm-level from 1992 to 2002. 
Human capital 
intensity 
Number of employees with a university degree divided by number of 
untrained employees in the industry. 
R&D intensity  Mean of R&D over gross production in the 1999 to 2002 period in the 
industry. 
New firm formation 
rate 
Mean annual number of new firms
a per employee
b at the 4-digit 
industry level 1998-2001. 
Herfindahl index  Mean of Herfindahl index over the 1992 to 2002 period 
Import share  Ratio of imports
c to domestic production, average of 1992 to 2002 
period. 
Average firm size  Log of mean number of employees in respective industry from 1992 to 
2002. 
Vertical specialization  Ratio of intermediate products to internal wage costs, average of 1992 
to 2002 period. 
Entrepreneurial 
character of industry 
Share of R&D expenditure on gross production in firms with less than 
50 employees over share of R&D expenditure in firms of all size 
categories. Mean value of the 1999-2002 period. 
Average sales growth  Average of annual firms’ growth rate of sales in the industry, mean of 
period 1992-2002. 
Share of West German 
firms 
Proportion of firms with headquarter in West Germany. 
Producer type  Intermediate products, investment good, durable consumer goods, non-
durable consumer goods. 
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Table A2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  Std  Dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Vertical 
specialization  2.035 1.276 1.710 0.289 9.034 
Capital intensity  0.045 0.018 0.040 0.012 0.143 
Human Capital 
Intensity  0.079 0.068 0.054 0.003 0.477 
R&D intensity  0.007 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.049 
Average firm size  5.208 0.795 5.122 3.711 9.268 
New firm formation  0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.022 
Herfindahl index  0.100 0.112 0.055 0.002 0.547 
Average sales growth  0.020 0.038 0.019 -0.095 0.150 
Share of West 
German Firms  86.73 10.54 89.47 33.33  100.00 
Dummy intermediate 
products  0.548 0.499 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Dummy investment 
goods  0.158 0.365 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Dummy non-durable 
consumer goods  0.232 0.423 0.000 0.000 1.000   34
 














































** 0.086 -0.101 -0.048 -0.040  -0.248
** 0.327
** 
Capital intensity  0.707 0.035  —  0.004 -0.157
* -0.149  0.069 0.188









** 0.086 -0.107 0.360 -0.139 
R&D intensity  0.496 -0.293
** -0.108 0.569
** — -0.154
* 0.372  0.085 -0.101 0.306
** 0.116 -0.086 0.352 -0.226
** 
Vertical 
specialization  0.763 0.494
** -0.213
** -0.050  -0.113  —  0.046  0.167
** -0.178
** 0.023 -0.201
** -0.029  -0.204 0.248
** 
Average firm size  0.608 -0.156
* 0.094 0.535
** 0.457
** 0.102  —  0.317
** -0.438
** 0.175
* -0.115 0.023  0.157 -0.125 




** — -0.034  -0.048  -0.252
** 0.166
** -0.141 -0.048 
New firm 







* 0.104 -0.096 -0.093 0.114 
Average sales 




** —  0.006  0.167
** 0.087 -0.242
** 
Share of West 
German Firms  0.868 -0.072 -0.087 0.018  0.037 -0.281
** -0.170
** -0.298
**  0.086 0.025  —  -0.046 0.088 -0.004 
Dummy interme-
diate products  0.201 -0.026 0.515
** -0.002 -0.079  0.015  0.008  0.149
* -0.196
** 0.162
*  -0.012 — -0.476  -0.605
** 
Dummy investment 





















* Braivais-Pearson correlation coefficients above, Spearman correlation coefficients below the diagonal. *: statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **: statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. 
Note: Tol is defined as (1-Rsquare) of a regression of the respective variable on the other independent variables.  
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